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ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES

Franklin

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
John Edgar Hoover, Director

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May 1961

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
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INTRODUCTION

Israel is surrounded by threatening Arab countries. In striving to preserve its existence as a nation and to defend itself against these countries, the Israeli Intelligence Service gathers information which may have an effect on Israel's national security. Although Israel is a small country, it is able to obtain information because of the enormous support it receives throughout the world.

The purpose of this monograph is to give Agents in the field a background of Israeli intelligence activities in the United States so that this information might serve as an indication of what can be expected from these activities in the future.

The source of much of the material used in this monograph is Bureau reports that are not to be disseminated in order to protect the sources from which the information was received. Much also is taken from classified material in Bureau files. Documentation of all public source material used herein may be found at the end of this monograph. Documentation of information from Bureau files is being retained.

This monograph contains ~~secret~~ and ~~confidential~~ information. It has been prepared for Bureau use and must not be disseminated outside the Bureau.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Summary

The State of Israel strives to remain free of the power of Arab might and to preserve its existence. Soon after the Republic of Israel was created in 1948, it established in the United States an intelligence service to be handled by four persons operating under legal cover. Both political information and military information were sought.

Principal targets of Israeli intelligence activities in the United States are the aims and preparations of the Arab nations. Of almost equal importance is the influencing of United States policy and United Nations action to bolster Israel's position in her conflict with the Arab nations.

Classified material of the United States Government has been obtained by the Israelis. Israeli intelligence agents have operated in Israel's diplomatic establishments in this country--the Embassy, the Consulates, and the United Nations Delegation.

The Israeli Intelligence Service has proved its skill in operational techniques. It recruits Americans in positions of trust and those whose sympathies or circumstances make them desirable sources of information.

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Israel has been known to negotiate with communists in order to achieve an immediate objective. Because of Israel's strategic importance, its problems are of deep concern to the world.

B. Conclusions

1. The Research Department of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs offers cover for trained Israeli intelligence agents sent abroad.

2. Known Israeli agents in the United States operate under legal cover and recruit informants among sympathizers and persons strategically placed.

3. Israeli intelligence agents employ clandestine techniques to collect information.

4. The primary target of the Israeli Intelligence Service in the United States appears to be an effort to keep abreast of Arabian developments.

5. By means of liaison with certain United States intelligence groups in the United States, the Israeli Intelligence Service has sought to secure favorable treatment for Israel.

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I. THE REPUBLIC OF ISRAEL

The Republic of Israel, created in 1948, occupies the major portion of ancient Palestine, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea. Recent figures place the area of Israel at 7,993 square miles. In other words, Israel is about the size of the State of New Jersey. With the establishment of Israel, all restrictions on Jewish immigration were abolished and by January, 1959, Israel had received over 1,000,000 immigrants. Planned immigration is expected to absorb 400,000 from Europe by the end of 1962. The total population is 2,105,530. The non-Jewish (chiefly Arab) population numbers 224,400. ⁽¹⁾

Because of the great strategic importance of the Middle East, it had been the hope of the United Nations to strengthen the countries in that area so that those countries could individually or collectively withstand armed aggression on the part of any great power. Yet, from its formation, Israel met with the opposition of the Arab League. Because of the solidarity of the Jewish people, Israel, with some assistance from abroad, withstood the opposition. One result of this was the expulsion of almost a million Arabs from Israel. There followed a refugee problem for the surrounding Arab countries, whose animosity toward Israel and the United States increased. The Arabs concluded that the United States had favored the Israelis at the expense of the Arabs. Border strife

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continues to delay the hopes of the United Nations. One of the main objectives of the United States has been to ease the tension between Israel and the Arab States as a vital step toward the larger goal of bringing political stability to the Middle East. (2) (3)

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II. ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNISM

The policy of Premier David Ben-Gurion is for Israel to seek firmer ties with the West. Knesset (parliament) contains a coalition of several political parties, two of which are left socialist--Ahdut ha-'Avodah and Mapam. ⁽⁴⁾

Expediency can be given as the reason for those instances in which Israel has accepted support from individual communists. For example, a communist Jew, who traveled constantly between Switzerland and Czechoslovakia, allegedly supplied \$60,000,000 worth of war material to Israel during its war with the Arabs. When an Israeli intelligence official was reminded of this, he replied, "We Jews can not be choosy about our friends. If the Americans will not play with us, then we shall have to play ball with others."

An American newspaper columnist, during his visit to Israel in the Spring of 1960, stated that Israel can be relied upon as a Western ally in the struggle with international communism, because "a rather doctrinaire socialism is strong" there and "nobody is more aware of the real nature of communism, and more bleakly resolved to defeat it. . . ." ⁽⁵⁾

In the early Fall of 1943, the Soviet Government sent Ivan Maisky, then Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, on a long fact-finding tour to Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and Palestine. ⁽⁶⁾ Maisky studied Jewish achievements in the Holy Land and estimated Palestine's potentialities. His report

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would be the basis for Soviet policy. Shortly thereafter, the Middle East became the scene of widespread Russian activities.

To promote its interests in the Middle East, the Soviet Government preferred to gain the cooperation of the Palestinian Jews, according to remarks allegedly made in 1943 by a leading Soviet diplomat to a Jewish delegation. "Back in the twenties," he is reported to have said, "we could not but consider Zionism as an agency of British imperialism. And we were bound to treat you accordingly. Now, however," the Soviet diplomat continued, "the whole situation has changed... Should Soviet Russia be interested in the future in the Middle East, it would be obvious that the advanced and progressive Jews of Palestine hold out much more promise for us than the backward Arabs controlled by feudal cliques of Kings and effendis." Russia sees in the Middle East a foothold on the Mediterranean. An outlet to the warm seas has been one of the main traditional objectives of Russia's foreign policy. ⁽⁷⁾ Besides, this important area links three continents and dominates both land routes and waterways.

Israel, however, has not shown the cooperation with the Soviet Union that the United Arab Republic has. Speaking before the third congress of the National Union, political party of the United Arab Republic, on July 9, 1960, President Nasser praised the cooperation he said the Soviet Union has given his country. At the same time, he expressed regret for what he called the "bad behavior of the United States" and "the connection between American policy and Zionism." ⁽⁸⁾

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The problems, fundamental and imposed, social and economic, political and military, which the area presents will continue to challenge the ingenuity and patience of East and West. (9)

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III. ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Expert intelligence work has been attributed to the people destined to inhabit Israel. In Biblical times, Joshua and his associates, sent "to spy out the land of Canaan," brought back complete reports although they were confronted with major difficulties. Any talent the Israelites may have had in this field was certainly not dulled by the association of later generations with the British Intelligence Service during the long British mandate and with the Office of Strategic Services (O. S. S.) operations of World War II. Certain Israeli personnel came to the United States a few years ago and received training under the sponsorship of a United States intelligence agency.

Irving Brown, European representative of the American Federation of Labor, wrote back from Israel in 1956:

"...two things...have impressed me: 1) the army and their 'intelligence' regarding the Arab world and 2) the knowledge and the information of certain individuals about the Arabs and the various movements which are playing with the communists. I have come to the conclusion that it will be necessary for myself and others to keep in contact with these groups and individuals."

Herbert Hoover, Jr., former Undersecretary of State, once said of the Israeli espionage system--"Better than the Soviets." "Second to none!" was the evaluation given by Elmo Hutchison, formerly attached to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. William S. White, newspaper columnist, said in early 1960, "Not in all the history of military struggle has so much been known

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by so few--Israel's intelligence people--about so many. (10) According to information from [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The successful conclusion of the capture of Adolf Eichmann, former Nazi executioner of Jews, has been termed a very smooth operation. Israeli intelligence is credited with possession of a complete interception service.

Before Israel became a state on May 14, 1948, the two Zionist intelligence services--(1) Jewish Agency for Palestine, Incorporated, (political intelligence) and (2) Haganah (military intelligence)--had gained experience in the techniques of secret work and had established numerous networks in certain target countries. These advantages were at the disposal of the new intelligence service.

The new service was confronted by four basic tasks: (1) to stay abreast of the threatening Arabs, (2) to keep the Arabs from learning its own military secrets, (3) to handle immigration problems of those departing illegally from another country to enter Israel, and (4) to assimilate Israel's newly acquired population, some of which had spent years circumventing authority.

The new intelligence service decided to work abroad through Israel's diplomatic representatives. In April, 1951, all branches of Israeli intelligence were placed under control of a combined directing board, the

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Joint Services Intelligence Committee, of which Reuven Shiloah was appointed head. In September, 1952, Isser Halpren replaced him and Shiloah came to the United States in 1953 as Israel's Foreign Minister.

"Stations abroad," i. e., field offices outside of the Middle East, are directly controlled by Hareshut, the central intelligence authority. Lateral communications between these stations are discouraged. At least one station is maintained in the United States. Operations in this country have been concentrated in the New York City and the Washington, D. C., areas. These activities are continuing.

Early activity in the United States stemmed from the Arabs' announced resolution to resist by force of arms any United Nations attempt to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. Consequently, shipments of explosives from certain American companies to Israel were clandestinely arranged. Other events showed that Zionist organizations in the United States were closely connected and engaging in similar activities on behalf of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. They went about getting airplanes for Israel and recruiting personnel for Israeli forces.

Eliahu Elath, representative of the Jewish Agency in Washington, D. C., used American citizens to procure general information from Government sources and to influence persons who might determine United States policy. Israel's official representatives in the United States have sought the cooperation of our Government and military personnel, sometimes officially, sometimes on the basis of a friendship, and sometimes clandestinely.


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In December, 1948, Efraim Ben-Arzi arrived in the United States to serve as Israel's Military Attache in Washington, D. C.

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According to another United States Government agency engaged in intelligence work, the Hebrew name for Israel's counterespionage and security service is Sherut Bitachon. The word "sherut" means "service," and "bitachon" means "security." The security service appears to be more generally referred to as Shin Bet (Shinbet), perhaps an abbreviation. Shinbet is one of the five formerly independent branches of the Israeli Intelligence Service--serving the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Defense--which since April, 1951, have been centralized. Activities of the intelligence branch are carried out mainly outside of Israel. The public learned of it recently in connection with the apprehension of Adolf Eichmann.

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Training schools exist today where recruits are prepared for service.

Recruits are drawn from among Hebrew University graduates and well-trained ex-army officers. Immigrant recruits are those who have proven themselves in their Zionist organization at their previous residence or in the Jewish underground in those countries where Zionism has been outlawed.

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

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IV. ISRAELI AGENTS

It is known that the Israeli Intelligence Service has a cover organization in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That cover organization is called the Research Department.

Benjamin Eliav, of the Research Department of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, came to New York in April, 1960, to represent the Israeli Government not only as Consul General but also as a leading member of the United Nations Delegation. A highly placed source of another United States intelligence agency

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The United States agency mentioned above makes an assertion that Eliav is very likely still a member of the Israeli Intelligence Service and also that, whether or not personnel abroad have diplomatic cover, many, many of them are Israeli Intelligence Service men.

That Israel sends to the United States its very capable men can be seen by other examples which follow.

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A. Gideon Rafael

On October 13, 1959, an informant advised Bureau Agents that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The informant stated that [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] As of January, 1949, Rafael's name was among the four designated to handle the work of the Israeli Intelligence Service in the United States.

B. Reuven Shiloah

Referral/Consult

Another Israeli diplomat reported to have received experience in the Israeli Intelligence Service is Reuven Shiloah. It was said that he had been in charge of political and economic intelligence in Israel and of military intelligence abroad until September, 1952. Shiloah came to the United States as Minister from Israel in 1953, remaining until 1957. [REDACTED]

C. David Peleg

David Peleg, a former United States citizen, had been Shiloah's number-one man. Peleg was a known Israeli intelligence agent in the United States under cover as Assistant Military Attache from 1950 to 1952.


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D. Nachman Karni



Nachman Karni, First Secretary of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations, was a top-ranking officer in Israeli Army Intelligence just prior to his coming to the United States.

E. Rafael Medan



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Another informant pointed out that



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Medan's service in the United States ended in January, 1959. He came here as Press Attache with the Israeli United Nations Delegation. With that office as cover, an office staff in his confidence, open contact with the Consulates and the Embassy in this country, he was well situated to carry on clandestine operations. He or his paid informants contacted

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representatives of Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. He also had other agents in other countries. He exhibited masterful operational techniques and sought a wide range of targets.

F. Eliezer E. Marom

Eliezer E. Marom was Rafael Medan's replacement. It has been alleged that Marom was a member of the Israeli Intelligence Service during his tour as consular officer at Nicosia, Cyprus, from 1952 to 1956. Medan had had operational experience in Vienna, Austria, before being sent to the United States.

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V. SOURCES AND INFORMANTS

The Israeli Intelligence Service uses its sources according to their ability to serve. The following are examples of some who have been approached outright and some who have been maneuvered into positions where service could be demanded of them.

A. American Citizens

1. Merchant-Seaman Radio Operator

A naturalized American has been acting as courier and observer for the Israeli Intelligence Service since 1955. He makes trips to the Middle East as a merchant-seaman radio operator.

2. Sympathizers

An investigation was being conducted by a private detective in New York City in 1947. During the investigation, the detective's nephew installed a radio transmitter in a Cadillac used by Arab officials to travel to United Nations meetings. An American citizen, who knew about the plan, indicated his desire to bring the Israeli Intelligence Service into the operation for whatever benefit might be derived. This Israeli sympathizer boasted that he formerly lived in Washington, D. C., and had obtained documents surreptitiously from "an Arab embassy" there.

3. Spouses

In 1954, an Israeli intelligence agent married [redacted]

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[redacted] He was considered one

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of the more capable operators, not above exploiting the potential intelligence source he acquired through his marriage. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
In another case, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] set about compiling information

for a friend of the Israeli Embassy's Scientific Counselor. He was invited to the Embassy to discuss matters.

4. Girl Friends

A girl employed in the United States Department of State was acquainted with known and suspected Israeli intelligence agents. In 1956, one of these agents asked her to arrange for his introduction to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was asked to furnish information.

In 1958, the girl employed in the United States Department of State was of continuing interest to the Israeli Intelligence Service because she had access to top-secret information in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence.

5. Member of White House Staff

In March, 1953, the Israeli officials in Washington, D.C., made a concerted effort to develop a member of the White House staff as one of their contacts.

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6. Procurement Officer

Referral/Consult

7. Foreign Service Employee

Referral/Consult

8. Armed Services Personnel

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Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

9. Employee of United Arab Republic in Rome

While on a business trip to Rome, Italy, in 1958, an American citizen acquired a mistress. She was an Italian-born divorcee, a citizen of the United States, and employed as [] at the Embassy of the United Arab Republic in Rome. He has said that, as a Jew, he wanted to help the Israelis. Since he realized the woman's intelligence potential, he advised an Israeli intelligence agent at the United Nations and arrangements were made for the recruiting of the woman.

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B. Others

1. Jordanians

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
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2. Hungarian

Ladislav Farago, a Hungarian writer employed by Radio Free Europe, said he was asked by an Israeli representative to write a manuscript regarding United States policy toward Israel and the Arab States. He said he was promised payment.

3. Lebanese

On September 23, 1959,



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and a suspected Israeli intelligence agent, visited officials

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at the Pentagon with the Prime Minister of Lebanon. The purpose of this visit was to discuss official military matters.

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4. Italians

An Italian

[redacted] worked for the Israeli Intelligence Service in Italy in 1948. He has been described as an individual who naturally sympathizes with the State of Israel. At [redacted] he furnished to the Israelis advance information which came to his attention through his numerous contacts with Arab officials. He received regular monthly payments from Israeli Intelligence personnel at [redacted] Reportedly no longer employed by [redacted] he continued his regular contacts.

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
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5. International Traveler

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6. Students

A South American-born Jewish student in the United States sought summer employment on ships going to foreign countries. The Israelis gave him a camera, which they expected him to use in their behalf, particularly while in port in target countries of the Middle East. But the only work he could find open was on a ship to Hawaii. He pledged his cooperation on his next summer vacation. Meantime, he was instructed to return the camera.

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
7. Israeli Reporter

A female Israeli reporter, of loose moral character, was reported to be "100 percent in Israeli Intelligence." Through her promiscuity, she is said to have sought intelligence information.

The Bureau has carefully looked into all of these potential

security problems.

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Some cases have been presented to the Attorney

General for opinion as to whether certain individuals should register as agents of a foreign government.

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VI. TARGETS

Three aims of the Israelis determine their intelligence targets in the United States:

1. They hope to gain support for Israel in her conflict with the Arab nations.
2. They desire to influence United States foreign policy in their favor.
3. They want to know United Nations thinking in advance of any action which might be unfavorable to Israel.

The sincere hope of the United States for the success of the State of Israel encouraged a somewhat jealous feeling and a deliberately calculated plan on the part of the Israelis. They wanted to be a "partner" of a United States that frowned on the aggression of the communist-sympathizing neighbors of Israel. Therefore, United States foreign policy toward and economic assistance in the Middle East became matters for intelligence collecting, which accelerated after the United States gained a better understanding of the goals of President Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic. A spokesman for Egypt charged that Israel and Zionist groups in the United States now try "to destroy the very foundations of our (United States and United Arab Republic) cooperation and understanding." (11)

The following targets have been sought by Israeli agents in the United States during the 1955-1960 period:

A. Targets Regarding the United States

1. Information regarding shipments of chemicals and firearms to Arab countries.

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2. Attempts of Arabs in the United States to purchase weapons
3. Identity of any United States officials opposed to President Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic
4. What advantages the Arabs have in the United States Department of State
5. Movements of the United States Army and Navy
 - a. Troop movements in the Middle East
 - b. Sixth fleet movements
6. Armed Forces
 - a. Maintenance
 - b. Administration
 - c. New gadgets
 - d. Equipment
 - e. Fuel for aircraft
 - f. Supplies
7. Weapons moving into Syria
8. United States policy toward Syria and Lebanon
9. United States thinking on build-up of Russian arms in Syria
10. Names of an informant's business friends
11. Personnel files of certain representatives of the United States Government serving in the Asia-African area, in order to learn their attitude toward "Jews."
12. Informant in the Department of State
 - a. To cultivate friendships
 - b. To learn policy
 - c. To obtain a transfer to a foreign post
13. Informant to enroll in some school for courses relating to the Middle East
14. Informant to obtain a place on the staff of the Secretary of State, travel with him to conferences abroad

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15. Subject matter of propaganda campaigns of the Arab Information Center
16. All Arab activities in the United States, particularly diplomatic and military
17. Activities of the Arab establishments in Washington, D. C., and information regarding the establishments
18. Results of the 1959 Arab Conference in Missouri
 - a. Meetings and banquet coverage of Eighth Annual Convention of Arab Students
 - b. Polish-born Israeli student, conversant with Arabic language, to report on meeting held at University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, on September 1-5, 1959

B. Targets Regarding the Arab Countries

1. Syria
 - a. Periodicals
 - b. Carbon copies of cables
 - c. Sample signatures of Embassy officials
 - d. Visa extension forms
 - e. Tax stamps for passports
 - f. Purchasing mission's interest in machinery
 - g. Military students in the United States
 - h. College students in the United States
 - i. Codes
 - j. Ambassador's speeches
 - k. Photographed copies of all reports of Farid Zeineddine, Syrian delegate to the United Nations.
 - l. Information going to the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 - m. Military plans
2. Iraq
 - a. Activities and information from the New York Consulate
 - (1) Location of area where speeches are prepared and mimeographed
 - (2) Information from wastebaskets
 - (3) Security of safes and files
 - (4) Number of safes

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- (5) Number of codes
 - (6) People on the black list
 - (7) Steamships on the black list
 - (8) Employees, their specific assignments, and detailed backgrounds
 - (9) Officials and what work they handle
 - (10) Mail received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 - (11) Report from a locked desk
 - (12) Law governing travel of Jews in Iraq
- b. Dr. Fadhil al-Jamali's American friends and advisors (Jamali was later imprisoned as an imperialist agent.)⁽¹²⁾
 - c. Activities of the United Nations Delegation from Iraq
3. Egypt
 - a. Photographs of Egyptian ships in New York Harbor
 - b. Photographs of submarine nets in Alexandria Harbor
 - c. Newspapers from Egypt
 - d. Egyptian planes shot down and pilots killed
 - e. Egyptian planes in operation
 - f. Warship and patrol ship activity in Alexandria Harbor
 4. Jordan
 - a. Any particular type of war industry being developed
 - b. What plans the Revolutionary Council was formulating
 5. Embassy of the United Arab Republic
 - a. Any information mailed out
 - b. Stamps
 - c. Stamp pads
 - d. Application forms
 - e. Plans of the building
 - f. Signatures of officials
 - g. Information from the Military Attache

C. Targets Regarding the United Nations

1. Advance information on moves of various Arab Delegations having to do with decisions on the refugee problem

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2. Documents from Moroccan Delegation
3. Decisions on the Palestinian refugee problem
4. Literature from the Arab States Information Center
(Arab States Delegation Office)

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VII. TECHNIQUES

A. Liaison

Israel, being a new and ambitious state with problems to solve, looked outside for help of its own choosing. In 1957, a group of Israelis came to the United States expecting to make themselves "partners" with United States officials in sharing intelligence information. Limited liaison for intelligence has been arranged between Israeli Embassy officials and certain intelligence groups in the United States.

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B. Principal Agents

Besides this legitimate collection of information, Israeli intelligence agents in the United States use almost all of the clandestine techniques ever devised to secure added information surreptitiously. Incidentally, one

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Performing illegal operations under legal cover is according to the plan of Israeli intelligence agents in the United States. All of these operations are handled by a principal who usually is assigned to the Embassy

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in Washington, D.C., as a diplomatic representative; is serving with the Delegation to the United Nations; or is a New York Consulate representative. When information about his past comes to light, it is no surprise to find that he has had intelligence training and even had previous intelligence assignments outside of Israel. Ordinarily, these agents adopt familiar cover names, such as Fred, Ralph, Carl, Louis, and Murray. These are the names by which their informants know them. For further protection, a trained intelligence agent investigates all new employees of the Israeli establishments in the United States. One investigative technique utilized by a former Israeli agent was to contact various Rabbis and request information on individuals. It appears that employees are screened closely, and certainly their sentiment is for the State of Israel. Secretaries are known to be cognizant of their employers' contacts and their cover names in order that they may handle calls.


C. Recruitment

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Referral/Consult




In another instance suggestive of a recruitment technique, a letter "urgent and very confidential" dated [redacted] was brought to [redacted]

[redacted] by [redacted]

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residing in Israel. The letter contained clippings from the Jerusalem Post Daily and implied the request for cooperation with Israeli Intelligence.



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Referral/Consult

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(S) Women too figure in the Israeli recruitment program.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

An American businessman on a trip to Rome, Italy, in 1958, took as his mistress a naturalized American divorcee employed by the Embassy of the United

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Arab Republic in Rome. He stated later that, being Jewish, he wanted to help the Israelis and therefore, upon his return to Washington, told an agent at the Israeli Embassy about the possibility of recruiting her. The agent arranged to have the woman contacted for information. For her cooperation, she was offered the price of an education for her small son. The businessman said he had felt no compunction, since the matter was between two foreign countries and regarded operating in a third. Another aspect of this case appears on page 18, item 9.

D. Informant Development

Due to the nature of Israeli targets, Israeli informants are sought among Government employees. They are entertained, often taken to a public place to dine, and are encouraged to broaden their social contacts among target people and to pick up information at cocktail parties. However, occasionally informants have been warned against meetings in public places and the use of the telephone except in emergency. Stress is placed upon production.

Clandestine operations require the informant to know his principal by a cover name, to transfer material to him in the pages of a newspaper or magazine, by mail addressed to his secretary, and by mail drop. In one instance, the informant was given in which to conceal filmed information. b7D

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Israeli informants have been operated in one position, then ordered to transfer or seek employment in some other office with greater potential for the Israelis.

Danger signals are arranged and cover provided when needed. As an example of the latter, a Jordanian employed by Israeli agents in the United States was to be sent from the United States on an assignment in the Middle East. He was taught something of the textile business by an allegedly innocent sympathizer in the United States, so that the informant could legitimately represent an American company on a commission basis to cover his intelligence assignment for the Israelis.

Detailed operational instructions include operating a camera, taking and returning official documents, and, when necessary, the use of wiretapping and secret writing.

E. Students

In late 1953, the Israelis must have sensed benefits to be derived from political work among students in California. They sent a representative there to arrange seminars to bring the Israeli point of view to the public and to Jewish leaders.

In 1956, there were Israeli students engaging in espionage in the United States. Their duty was to recruit informants and turn them over to a principal.

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Subsequently, it was shown by statistics that 40 percent of the Israeli students in the United States were in the New York area, that approximately 220 were in California and Colorado, and that approximately 100 of those in the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas were studying engineering, mathematics, chemistry, or agriculture. It is not doubted that almost the entire body of students from Israel has no connection with that country's intelligence activity. [REDACTED]

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Also in 1957, a [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] arrived in the United States

to do research work at [REDACTED]

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An Israeli club at the University of California in 1957 was set up to counteract Arab propaganda at the University. One tour made by these students cost approximately \$1,550 and covered more than 20 universities on the coast. According to a new arrangement, the United States had been divided into three or four regions, each having a secretary, to carry on student work methodically.

There is a definite indication that the Israeli students engaged in intelligence activity in the United States received guidance from a person


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at the Embassy. In this regard, a known member of the Israeli Intelligence Service, Chaim Yaary, who was First Secretary before his departure for Israel on August 3, 1958, had been, for approximately two years, the consultant on student matters.


F. Funds

Referral/Consult



Israeli agents pay their informants according to the quality and the quantity of the information they furnish. No production, no pay.


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on a monthly basis.

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



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Procedure of payment often has been handled thus:

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On numerous occasions, the operator of an amusement company in New Jersey was contacted by a known Israeli agent. The operator, aware of the agent's intelligence activities in the United States, was reported to be a personal friend of Premier David Ben-Gurion and the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir. It is possible that he is financially supporting part of the Israeli intelligence activities.

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In the later '50s, the Israelis made a deep study of their system of payment in the interest of developing a method that would not attract attention., [REDACTED]

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G. Ways and Means of Collecting Intelligence

1. Mail Drops

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2. Microphones and Taps

In 1957, Nachman Karni, a First Secretary of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations, approached a New York apartment house

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owner and, identifying himself as an "FBI Agent," sought permission to "wire" the apartment to be occupied by Ahmed Sherif, Consul General of Egypt. Karni was alleged to have a background of Israeli military intelligence service.

It was reported in August, 1954, that technical surveillances of officials of certain Arab nations had involved over 40 individuals. These surveillances were set up in hotel rooms and automobiles. Israeli intelligence agents expected to benefit.

One of the original body of Israeli intelligence agents in the United States claimed to be an expert in wiretapping, monitoring of conversations through the use of concealed microphones, and similar technical matters.

Referral/Consult

3. Surreptitious Entry

Illegal entry into the consular offices of certain Arab nations has been used as an Israeli intelligence technique.

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4. Codes, Ciphers, and Secret Ink

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Another Israeli informant was instructed to call her principal at the New York Consulate only in an emergency and from a pay telephone, ask for [redacted] and then ask her for permission to speak with [redacted]

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5. Photography

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During 1956, an Israeli intelligence agent developed [redacted] [redacted] as an informant and gave her instructions in methods to [redacted]


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